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REVIEW
David Luban, Georgetown University Law Center
Forthcoming, Ethics (July 2010)
Daniel Markovits, A Modern Legal Ethics: Adversary Advocacy in a Democratic Age,
Princeton University Press, 2008, xii + 361 pp.
In his ambitious, original, and theoretically elegant book, Daniel Markovits
defends the traditional lawyer’s role as a one‐sided partisan advocate who favors
client interests regardless of the justice of the cause or the tactics. He unfolds the
argument in dialectical fashion: he begins by setting out the moral critique of the
advocate’s role in an unusually strong form, then argues that from an alternative
point of view the critique disappears altogether because the lawyerly vices may be
redescribed as a virtue distinctive to the lawyer’s role, which he calls “fidelity. “
Then in a final dialectical twist Markovits speculates that the conditions under
which his “happy conclusion” (79, 103) follows no longer exist in modern society.
That is because impartial cosmopolitan morality has displaced the insular role
moralities and self‐regulating guilds that once supported a lawyer’s capacity to
redescribe lawyerly vices as virtues.
I
Markovits argues that the basic structure of adversary advocacy necessarily
compels lawyers to lie and cheat. Although ethics rules can mitigate lying and
cheating by prohibiting its most egregious forms, no possible set of “metes and
bounds” on advocacy (Markovits’s term for ethics regulations) can eliminate the
lawyerly vices without abolishing adversariness altogether. Client loyalty and
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control require lawyers to make arguments they don’t believe (lying) and to
promote outcomes they recognize to be substantively unjust (cheating).
Reformers in both the academy and the bar want to push legal ethics norms
into closer alignment with ordinary morality. Markovits believes their agenda has
prevailed in recent years (105), but he finds debates over the metes and bounds of
advocacy unsatisfying, because as long as lawyers remain liars and cheaters, fine‐
tuning the norms cannot offer lawyers a morally attractive ideal that they can
pursue with integrity. In any event, Markovits finds normative ethics
unphilosophical: “The task of philosophical ethics is … primarily to elaborate what
is rather than to command what should be” (19).
However, labeling even minor dissonances “lying” and “cheating” and
declaring them “lawyerly vices” inaccurately describes what is. It begs the question
of whether ordinary morality tolerates low‐level forms of lying and cheating in
adversarial situations. Must a parent arguing against his child’s expulsion from
middle school exhibit “a general, affirmative commitment to truthfulness” (48), as
Markovits supposes when he labels advocates who deviate from that commitment
liars (39‐40, 48)? May the parent, instead, argue that the expulsion is unfair even if
he fears that it isn’t? At a job interview, may a candidate assert more confidence in
her own abilities than she really has? May she answer illegal questions (for example,
about her child‐bearing plans) evasively because she really wants the job? If
behaviors like these make people liars and cheaters, it isn’t obvious that ordinary
morality invariably condemns liars and cheaters.
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This is important if you think the problem of lawyers’ role morality arises
from dissonance between role morality and ordinary morality. If the metes and
bounds of advocacy prohibit egregious lying, and permit only departures from
truthfulness equivalent to these examples, the lawyer’s role morality is not as
vicious as the words “liar” and “cheater” suggest.
Actually, Markovits’s own theory is more normative than he recognizes. His
defense of advocacy condemns “forms of lying that help clients to misrepresent
rather than to express themselves and forms of cheating that close off rather than
open up the judicial process” (95). The latter principle would forbid widely used
tactics such as strategic delay to exhaust an adversary’s resources, discovery abuse,
or filing a counterclaim to intimidate an adversary into dropping a lawsuit. More
generally, Markovits would require rules of ethics that make adjudication more
efficient, accurate, and fair (193); and he argues against partisanship that “is too
aggressive and succeeds at subverting the legal process into a one‐sided tool of his
client’s will” (202). It turns out to be harder to avoid normative ethics than
Markovits supposes.
II
Markovits notes that lawyers often defend themselves against charges of
immorality by the “adversary system excuse” (ASE): the adversary system requires
one‐sided partisanship, and the adversary system can be justified by impartial
moral reasons, such as the (doubtful) claims that it is the optimal system for finding
truth or defending rights. Critics of the ASE (such as myself—I coined the phrase
“adversary system excuse” in an eponymous 1983 essay rejecting it) are likewise
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ethical impartialists: they object that pursuing client interests against all others
cannot be reconciled with the moral equality of persons. Markovits observes that
even if the ASE succeeds (as he apparently thinks it does), it can at most show that
the advocate’s vocation is a necessary evil, not a moral good. He wishes to show the
latter, and to do so he launches a general attack against the “hegemony” of impartial
morality (in either its third‐person utilitarian form or its second‐person Kantian
form) over first‐person moral ideals. It is via first‐personal morality and the
demands of personal integrity, rather than the ASE, that Markovits hopes to defend
adversary advocacy.
III
Markovits argues that advocates can maintain personal integrity through
allegiance to one defining virtue, fidelity—by which he means not fidelity to law, but
fidelity to the client’s story, grasped empathetically and advocated without
interposing the lawyer’s own values or beliefs. Markovits borrows Keats’s concept
of “negative capability,” according to which the poet’s art lies in suppressing her
own viewpoint to permit the subject of the poem to shine forth. Fidelity and
negative capability go together, and require the lawyer to suppress her own
conscience to tell her client’s story. Viewed from the standpoint of fidelity, the
lawyer is the client’s mouthpiece, not a liar, and the client’s champion, not a cheater
(165). Under these redescriptions, a lawyer can rightly regard advocacy as a
positive virtue, rather than a necessary evil.
Markovits argues that lawyers’ fidelity and negative capability allow clients
to participate in the adjudicatory system, and participation is essential to
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legitimating adjudication. That is because participation transforms the nature of
disputes so that even the loser to whom substantive injustice is done can accept the
result of adjudication. Participating in adjudication transforms disputes in three
ways: by translating private grievances into more general terms, by moderating
unreasonable demands and expectations, and “by transforming brute demands into
assertions of right, which depend on reason and therefore…implicitly recognize the
conditions of their own failure” (188‐89).
Markovits then argues as follows: (i) Societies require some mechanism like
adjudication to transform disputes so they can be resolved. (ii) That mechanism
must be legitimized, and indeed “Justice is secondary to legitimacy in political life”
(202n.). (iii) Client participation legitimizes adjudication. (iv) Clients participate
through their lawyers. (v) But clients can accept this form of participation only if
they can trust their lawyers to be faithful and loyal partisans (197).
This is a controversial argument: anyone who agrees with Rawls that justice
is the first virtue of social institutions will reject step (ii) and deny the conclusion.
Moreover, contrary to Markovits’s stated aim (178), this argument offers an entirely
impartialist and in fact instrumental defense of adversary advocacy. Lawyers’
fidelity and loyalty are valuable because less faithful lawyers could not reconcile
clients to unhappy legal outcomes. Even if the argument succeeds, it is hard to see
how Markovits has provided more than another version of the ASE. There is
nothing first‐personal about the argument, and a lawyer who says to herself “I may
be doing injustice, but at least I am legitimating adjudication” has accepted advocacy
as a lesser evil.
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Markovits believes that he has gone beyond the ASE because the virtues of
fidelity and negative capability have “general appeal” (209) on their own. However,
the concept of negative capability does not transfer smoothly from the realm of
poetry to that of action. Negative capability of a high order allows Shakespeare to
portray characters like Richard III and Shylock sympathetically, shorn of moralizing.
But it is one thing for Shakespeare to suppress moral judgment when he portrays
the characters; it would be quite another if in real life he lawyered successfully for
the disinheritance of the princes or the enforcement of Shylock’s contract with
Antonio. Negative capability serves poetic truth; in the world of action, suppressing
conscience and advocating for wrong cannot so easily be defended by redescribing it
as negative capability. That is an evasion.
IV
Following Bernard Williams, Markovits gives central importance to the
lawyer’s own integrity; and his chief difference from other legal ethics theorists is
that he substitutes the question “how can a lawyer preserve her integrity?” for the
question “what should a lawyer do?” Throughout the book he takes what Hart calls
an external point of view on morality (reminiscent of Nietzsche and Williams). He
asks how moral principles serve to integrate the self, rather than taking them
seriously from an internal point of view as candidate right answers to moral
questions.
Markovits develops a version of Williams’s familiar argument that placing
impartial morality in a hegemonic position over first‐personal moral ideals makes
integrity impossible and undermines the conditions under which an ethical life is
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thinkable. Markovits believes that Williams erred by casting this as a psychological
argument about the cost of abandoning our ground projects. Markovits recasts first‐
personal moral ambitions as a condition of agency for creatures with bounded
rationality and bounded willpower. Because we are boundedly rational, it is
sometimes more reasonable not to revisit commitments already made; and because
we have an exhaustible reservoir of willpower, it is sometimes more reasonable not
to revisit courses of action already commenced. Markovits applies these ideas
specifically to morality: it is sometimes more reasonable not to permit impartial
moral reasons to encroach on first‐personal moral intentions and ambitions already
formed and already in motion.
Not only is it sometimes unreasonable to reconsider a decision or revise an
intention, it can even be unreasonable to revise intentions already formed after we
have reconsidered them and found them mistaken, because doing so depletes our
reservoir of willpower (147‐48). And, Markovits adds, in such cases it is
unreasonable for others to criticize us for failure to reconsider or to revise
intentions.
These claims are too strong to be right. Consider a non‐moral case. After
prolonged deliberation, Cecil decides to invest $50,000 in a speculative start‐up
business. Losing $50,000 will not destroy him, but he is not wealthy, and it
represents most of Cecil’s life savings. His friend Cecilia phones him and urgently
tells him that she has learned damaging information about the investment. On
Markovits’s view, the following conclusions follow: (a) it may be reasonable for
Cecil to hang up on Cecilia without hearing what she has to say; (b) hearing what
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she has to say and agreeing that it is damaging information, it may nevertheless be
reasonable for Cecil not to pull the plug on the investment; and (c) it is unreasonable
for anyone else to criticize Cecil for either (a) or (b) (144, 147‐48). It also seems to
follow—from (c)—that (d) it is unreasonable for Cecil to criticize himself for going
ahead with the investment, and therefore (e) given a similar choice, it is reasonable
for Cecil to do it again. This is no longer bounded rationality; this is boundless
irrationality.
For similar reasons, Markovits’s account of the relation between first‐person
and impartial morality does not merely break the “hegemony” of impartial morality,
but comes close to eliminating impartial morality. On his view, it may be reasonable
for an agent not to reconsider a course of action undertaken because of her own
first‐personal moral views, even in light of a strong impartial argument that the
course of action is morally impermissible; this holds even if the victim explicitly
calls the infraction to the agent’s attention (309 n. 47). And it is unreasonable for
anyone to criticize the agent for declining to reconsider or to change course if she
does reconsider, provided that she is acting on her first‐personal values (147‐48).
But condemning an act as morally impermissible is criticism; it follows, then, that
outsiders are estopped from condemning the act. If so, impartial morality appears
to have been exiled not only from the space of first‐personal deliberation (except
when by coincidence the agent’s first‐personal moral ambitions track impartial
morality), but also from the space of second‐ and third‐personal judgment.
Markovits does not believe this: he accepts that “first‐personal ambitions
(including…their departures from impartial morality) may be judged by others”
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(149) and he insists that first‐personal values are a complement, not a substitute,
for impartial morality (10, 169). But he does not explain how these conclusions are
consistent with his arguments about the architecture of morality, based on bounded
rationality and bounded willpower.
Markovits may respond that he has argued only that it is sometimes
reasonable not to reconsider a course of action, not that sticking to your guns is
always reasonable. But the “sometimes reasonable” position no longer sustains his
argument for the priority of first‐personal values. An impartialist will rightly insist
that if reconsidering a course of action is ever reasonable, it will surely be so when
the course of action is vulnerable to an impartial moral objection that someone
explicitly calls to the actor’s attention. “Inertial” persistence in prior plans makes
sense only when the plans are morally good or even neutral. Thus, Markovits
cannot maintain an in‐between position: either personal integrity trumps impartial
morality or it does not. If it does, his position exiles impartial morality. If it does
not, then his observation that bounded rationality and willpower require some
commitments to stand unquestioned excludes commitments that violate impartial
morality.
V
In the final section of the book Markovits argues that lawyers are “tragic
villains,” because even though he has shown that it is “conceptually possible” (213)
for a lawyer to live with integrity, modernity makes it practically impossible.
Modernity believes in equality and cosmopolitanism, so role moralities like the
lawyer’s can no longer be “authoritatively insular” (225). Today’s lawyers have
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become “anxiously cosmopolitan” (229). Today outsiders regulate the bar; its social
homogeneity has eroded; and lawyers specialize, identifying with particular types of
clients or causes they always represent, which threatens to confuse negative
capability with positive commitment to their side. (Startlingly, Markovits criticizes
public interest lawyers as “the apotheosis of this narrow form of legal practice”
(220)). Although Markovits denies that he is romanticizing the past (244), it is hard
to read chapter 9 as anything other than nostalgia for the clubbiness and
unaccountability of the late 19th century bar. For example, he repeatedly describes
the bar “capitulating” (237, 239, 241) to external regulation.
Near the end of the book, Markovits comes close to suggesting that what is
true for lawyers is true for “modernity quite generally” (249), so that, across the
board, first‐personal justification and integrity are no longer attainable although
they once were. It is hard to take this conclusion entirely seriously. The realization
that roles cannot be “authoritatively insular” is as ancient as Antigone, and
cosmopolitanism goes back to the Stoics; conversely, living with integrity hardly
seems like a vanished possibility in modernity.

